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SUMMARY
The article examines the role of trade unions in relation to the difficult ques-
tion of which workers are, or should be, regarded as employees for the pur-
poses of labour legislation. 
It starts by noting the changes in the globalised labour market that have led 
to the creation of hierarchies (divisions) amongst workers in the workplace 
– between those employed by the owner of the workplace and the workers of 
‘temporary employment services’ (TESs); between workers and ‘independent’ 
contractors who are not really independent; between workers in standard 
and non-standard employment; and between workers who are employed and 
those who are self-employed. 
The article argues that trade unions cannot afford to ignore these hierar-
chies. To do so means ignoring the traditions of working class solidarity on 
which trade unionism is founded and helping to entrench these hierarchies. 
The alternative is to challenge the divisions by organising the workers who 
are excluded at present. Significant gains can be made, it suggests, by work-
ing in parallel with other organisations, including those mobilising in the in-
formal economy. The starting point, however, is in the workplaces where their 
own members are located. 
The article looks at the amendments introduced to the Labour Relations 
Act (LRA) and Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA) in 2002, whereby 
certain workers are presumed to be ‘employees’, and criticises the shortcom-
ings of the amendments. The basic problem, it suggests, is not only to expose 
disguised employment relationships by recognising ‘dependent contractors’ 
as employees but to extend protection to employees in ‘triangular’ employ-
ment relationships (those who are treated as employees of the TES and not 
of the employer for whom they actually work) and others who are excluded 
from important provisions of labour legislation.
1 This articles draws and develops, the argument put forward by the author in ‘The erosion of workers’ 
rights and the presumption as to who is an employee’ (2002) 6 Law Democracy & Development 27.
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This struggle, the article concludes, is at the same time a struggle to or-
ganise the unorganised. The article warns against placing too much reliance 
on the courts. The best prospect for achieving broader legal protection is by 
effectively organising those who are excluded. But ‘before we can expect a 
change of mindset from the courts’, it suggests, ‘there must be a change of 
mindset amongst the unions’.
1  INTRODUCTION
In an important article about the relationship between trade unions and poli-
tics, more specifically about the relationship between trade unions and the 
Labour Party in Britain, Perry Anderson had this to say:
‘Trade unions can never achieve the highest level of action of a political party. Nor, for the 
very same reason, do they tend to sink to the lowest level either – melting en bloc into the 
system. For their function is rooted in the natural organisation of capitalism itself – the la-
bour market. The result is that trade unions are less easily chloroformed and suppressed 
totally than political parties, because they arise out of the groundwork of the economic 
system. As long as there are classes – and it is no longer in dispute that they exist in the 
West as much today as ever in the past – there will be class conflict.’2  
The reference to ‘the West’ gives away that this was written forty years ago, in 
the late 1960s, before the dismantling of the Berlin wall had swept away the 
Cold War notion of an East-West divide. It was also before the British Labour 
Party was swept away by Thatcherism. Of great significance for the rest of the 
world, it was also before the economic crisis of the 1970s, and the restructur-
ing of capitalism that ensued, and which is still ongoing.
It must have been the effects of this restructuring that Klaus Schwab had in 
mind when he referred to ‘a flat world’ in an opinion piece by that appeared 
in the local newspaper, shortly before the start of this year’s World Econom-
ic Forum meeting.3 Whether as a result of ‘globalisation’ or technological 
change, he claims, ‘we are witnessing everywhere a changing power equa-
tion. Power is moving from the centre to the periphery. Vertical command 
and control structures are being replaced by horizontal networks of social 
communities and collaborative platforms.’4
It is, of course, false that power is moving from the centre to the periphery. 
The reverse is true. Power is concentrated in ever few hands, located mainly 
in the developed world, and the divide between rich and poor has never been 
greater. That is the significance of the notion of a ‘North-South’ divide that 
replaced the ‘East-West’ one. What has changed is the manner in which 
power is exercised. Vertical command and control structures are indeed be-
ing replaced, where they are perceived as being unnecessary or inefficient 
(a process one commentator terms ‘vertical disintegration’).5 But there is no 
 
2 Anderson P ‘The limits and possibilities of trade union action’ in Blackburn R and Cockburn A (eds) 
The incompatibles: Trade union militancy and the consensus (1967)
3 Klaus Schwab is the chairperson of the World Economic Forum. 
4 Also published in Business Report 23 January 2007 (available at http://www.busrep.co.za/index.
php?fArticleId=3640671)
5 That is, in contrast to the ‘vertical integration’ that characterised industrial organisation in the earlier 
twentieth century: see Collins H ‘Independent contractors and the challenge of vertical disintegra-
tion to employment laws’ (1990) 10 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 353.  
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suggestion they are being replaced in the low wage countries where mass 
manufacture is increasingly located.    
The history of South Africa over the past forty years has been shaped by 
these developments. South Africa can be described as a Southern country with 
Northern pretensions. On account of its Northern pretensions it embraced 
trade liberalisation at about the same time as it embraced constitutional de-
mocracy. Faced with an increasingly competitive economic environment as a 
result of its integration into the global economy, firms were constrained to cut 
costs. Labour is usually the only significant cost over which firms have some 
control. By restructuring their operations to externalise employment, firms 
were able at one stroke both to cut costs and eliminate vertical command and 
control structures. 
As a consequence of firms restructuring and for other reasons, the structure 
of the labour market has changed and is changing still. On the one hand, the 
notion of a dual economy, corresponding to a formal-informal divide, has 
now received official sanction. While the existence of an informal economy 
is not new, all indications are that it has grown relative to the formal econ-
omy since 1994, specifically as a consequence of the relative decline of the 
primary sector and manufacturing.6 On the other hand, what employment 
growth there has been, has been in the services sector and in industries akin 
to services, like construction. 
The expansion of the services (or ‘tertiary’) sector raises challenges of a 
particular kind for trade unions. As in the informal economy, workers in this 
sector are largely unorganised. More profoundly, the dynamic of employment 
in the tertiary sector is in many respects different from employment in the 
primary or secondary sectors. The notion of services privileges the customer 
or client to whom services are rendered, giving employment a triangular char-
acter. In the case of some services, such as contract cleaning, security and 
temporary employment services, the client literally determines the param-
eters of the employment contract between the service provider and those who 
do the actual work. In these circumstances there is, in the strictest sense, a 
triangular employment relationship. 
The challenge the informal economy poses for trade unions is no less 
profound. Indeed, it is not a separate challenge. The notion of an informal 
economy is contested, but all definitions regard it as economic activity that 
is in effect unregulated. Although workers in employment in the services sec-
tor are covered by labour legislation, labour legislation has been formulated 
largely in response to the experience of workers and employers in the primary 
and secondary sectors. Workers in a triangular employment relationship are 
in effect excluded from key protections that legislation provides, even though 
they are perhaps better off than workers who are entirely excluded because 
they are not regarded as ‘employees’ as defined in labour legislation.
6 For an analysis of trends in the informal economy, see Devey R, Skinner C and Valodia I ‘Second 
best? Trends and linkages in the informal economy in South Africa.’ Development Policy Research 
Unit working paper No 06/102 (2006) University of Cape Town.
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The effect of these changes in the labour market is to create a series of hier-
archies amongst the employed. Firstly, there is a hierarchy in the formal work-
place between those who are employed by the person who owns or controls 
that workplace and the workers of the service providers whom that person 
engages as client. In a more or less equivalent position, there are individuals 
engaged as ‘independent’ contractors, who are not really independent and 
to whom the term ‘dependent contractor’ more appropriately applies.7 This 
hierarchy can also be described in terms of the divide between standard and 
non-standard employment. Secondly, it is a hierarchy between those in an 
employment relationship of some kind and workers who are self-employed. 
Trade unions can of course ignore these hierarchies. But to do so would 
mean ignoring the traditions of working class solidarity on which trade un-
ionism is founded, thus following in the footsteps of many political parties 
that did this to their cost. It would also have the effect of entrenching these 
hierarchies in the workplace and the labour market as a whole. The alterna-
tive course is to challenge it through organising the excluded workers. This is 
too large a task for trade unions to accomplish on their own. In parallel with 
other endeavours to mobilise in the informal economy, however, significant 
gains could be made, starting in the workplaces where their own members are 
located, and where unions have the most clout. 
2  LEGAL CLAIMS AND THE DEFINITION OF EMPLOYEE
Since the first Industrial Conciliation Act in 1924 the definition of an em-
ployee has always been a key mechanism to exclude workers from the scope 
of labour legislation. The current definition is based on the definition in the 
1956 Labour Relations Act. Then, as now, it comprised two parts. The first 
part concerns any person whomsoever who is employed by or working for 
any employer and receiving or entitled to receive remuneration. The second 
includes any other person whomsoever ‘who in any manner assists in the 
carrying on or conducting of the business of an employer’.8
The capacity of trade unions to organise those whom the legislation ex-
cludes has always depended on their capacity to utilise what legal space is 
available for this purpose. Legal space is not found by a close reading of the 
provisions of black-letter law, I would argue, as much as by claiming it, based 
on a position that is just and politically defensible. Law, in this analysis, is not 
simply a set of meanings assigned by lawyers and courts, but derives from the 
meanings that the broader community assign to it and, in the case of labour 
legislation, the meanings assigned to it by organised labour and business. 
In the period prior to the political transition that started in1994, there are a 
number of examples of trade unions successfully claiming legal space in this 
way in order to extend the scope of the definition of ‘employee’. Before 1979, 
when the recommendations of the Wiehahn Commission were adopted, the 
reference to ‘any person whomsoever’ in the definition of ‘employee’ was 
7 The phrase ‘dependent contractor’ is up until the present not recognised in South African law. How-
ever it has received statutory recognition in some other jurisdictions, notably Canada.
8 S 1(1), Act 28 of 1956
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qualified by a racial exclusion.9 When in the 1940s this exclusion referred to 
the gamut of regulations that applied to ‘native’ men, trade unions, such as 
the Food and Canning Workers Union claimed the legal space that existed 
as a result of the fact that African women were not required to bear passes to 
organise African women into a registered union. 
In the 1970s, long after that particular loophole had been closed, the emer-
gent unions claimed the legal space that other statutes provided to organise 
workers: wage determinations (the predecessors of sectoral determinations) 
in terms of the Wage Act,10 and works committees in terms of the Black La-
bour Relations Regulation Act.11 Moreover, even when the claims made were 
clearly outside the provisions of black-letter law, if not downright illegal, 
emergent unions discovered legal space in the hesitancy of the authorities to 
enforce legal provisions that were widely rejected as not being just or politi-
cally defensible.12    
The phrase ‘working for any employer’ in the first part of the definition 
also appears to signify someone other than an employee who works for an 
employer but to whom the legislation nevertheless applies. So, too, argu-
ably, is the second part of the definition. There seems to be no reason why a 
union seeking to organise and protect the rights of workers in non-standard 
employment, even including a contractor who is not genuinely independent, 
could not claim this legal space on the basis that the definition applies. Yet 
this did not happen under the 1956 Act, nor has it happened under the LRA 
of 1995. 
Under the 1956 Act, arguably, trade unions did not have occasion to con-
sider the situation of workers in non-standard employment since the process 
of restructuring described above is a comparatively recent phenomenon. A 
conventional view is that it was a response to the economic shock induced by 
the oil price increases of 1973. In fact, it only took off in a Northern country, 
such as Britain in the mid-1980s;13 in South Africa it is primarily a phenom-
enon of the 1990s. Yet recent research suggests that well before the 1980s 
employers, or a section of employers, had anticipated the kinds of changes 
they would later be implementing. 
In the 1950s and 1960s in the United States, during the hey-day of the 
‘New Deal’ model of labour relations, the ‘temporary help’ industry, or what 
is now called temporary employment services (TESs) in this country, led by 
Manpower Inc., successfully prosecuted a legal claim of some magnitude. In 
a series of legal struggles in state courts it managed to win recognition for the 
proposition that the agency was the legal employer of the workers it placed 
  9 In the original definition of ‘employee’, the exclusion applied to indentured Indian workers and 
Africans required to bear passes who, until the 1950s, were limited to men. See s 1, Industrial Con-
ciliation Act 36 of 1937.
10 Act 5 of 1957, repealed by the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997
11 Act 48 of 1953, repealed by Act 57 of 1981, which in turn has been repealed by the LRA of 1995.
12 See, for example, Friedman’s account of the 1973 Durban strikes and the failure of the police to 
intervene, as well as the utilisation of statutory provisions to organise African workers: Friedman S 
Building tomorrow today (1987) at 46–60.  
13 See Atkinson J ‘Flexibility or fragmentation? The United Kingdom labour market in the eighties’ 
(1987) 12 Labour and Society No 1 at 87. 
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with a client.14 In that country and elsewhere, TESs constituted an ‘active 
institutional presence’ promoting vertical disintegration.15 
Further research is required to establish the circumstances in which, in 
1983, the definition of employee was amended to provide for the notion of 
a labour broker’s office and to ‘deem’ labour brokers to be the employers of 
those whom they supplied to their clients.16 But it is probably not coinciden-
tal, given the experience in the United States, that at that time Manpower 
Inc. had been operating in the country for some years.17 In any event, the 
amendment signified, firstly, that labour broking was legitimate. Secondly, as 
in the case of the United States, it signified for employers at large an oppor-
tunity to insulate themselves against labour-related risks. 
This was at a juncture at which workers and unions were becoming in-
creasingly litigious. At the same time, the growth of the emergent unions was 
putting upward pressure both on direct and indirect wage costs. So, too, was 
the phasing out of the migrant labour system. The irony is that, as the migrant 
labour system was being phased out, labour brokering was phased in: For the 
legal tool utilised in the migrant labour system, the fixed-term contract, was 
the same legal tool that labour brokers, or TESs, would rely on.
Thus, whereas migrant workers used to work year in, year out for the same 
employer without ever acquiring the status of permanency, workers placed by 
TESs may work ‘temporarily’, year in, yearout for the same client. The term 
of their contract is determined by the operational requirements of the client. 
They can therefore count themselves lucky if the client does not terminate 
their services because another TES can provide the service cheaper. If the 
client does terminate for this reason, as frequently happens, the contract may 
terminate automatically.18 This is also the situation in which workers in con-
tract cleaning and security services, amongst others, find themselves. 
A conventional view of the LRA is that it consolidated the achievements of 
the emergent unions in the years of struggle. Yet the consequences of some of 
the compromises arrived at in the negotiations that gave rise to the LRA are 
only now becoming apparent. In these negotiations, organised labour had an 
historic opportunity to reverse the proposition that the TES was the employer.19 
 
14 See Gonos G ‘The contest over ‘employer’ status in the post-war United States. The case of tempo-
rary help firms’ (1997) 31 Law and Society Review No 1 at 81-110. 
15 See Peck J and Theodore N ‘Temped out? Industry rhetoric, labor regulation and economic restruc-
turing in the temporary staffing business’ (2002) 23 Economic and Industrial democracy 143.
16 A labour broker was defined as someone who ‘conducts or carries on the business of a labour bro-
ker’s office.’ A labour broker’s office was defined as ‘any business whereby a labour broker for reward 
provides a client with persons to render services to or perform work for the client or procures such 
persons for him, for which service or work such persons are remunerated by the labour broker.’ See 
s 1 of Act 28 of 1956, as amended by Act No 2 of 1983.
17 See Theron J with Godfrey S and Lewis P ‘Labour broking and its policy implications’ Labour and 
development monograph (2005) 1, University of Cape Town.
18 The situation legal commentators have euphemistically described as ‘second-generation outsourc-
ing’ is generally a consequence of this form of undercutting. On the effect of the termination of 
work for a client on the employment contract of a TES employee, see NUCCAWU v Transnet Ltd t/a 
Portnet (2000) 21 ILJ 2288 (LC) and Hlanga v Ithemba Labour Facilitation (Case no WE3144-07; 
unreported arbitration award dated 11 June 2007).
19 The historical significance of this opportunity was that the entire package of provisions making up 
what is now the LRA of 1995 was the lannego.
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It does not appear that this possibility was even contemplated. Similarly, or-
ganised labour had the opportunity to seek a more expansive definition of 
‘employee’, or at least to retain the ambiguity of the status quo, particularly 
the reference in the 1956 Act to a person who works for (as opposed to one 
employed by) another. Instead it accepted a wording that eliminates one pos-
sible interpretation of the phrase ‘works for’, by inserting the qualification 
‘other than an independent contractor’.20 
It might be said, as organised business doubtlessly argued, that the quali-
fication ‘other than an independent contractor’ merely affirmed the position 
that had always prevailed, as confirmed by the courts. But this is to disregard 
the role of legislation as a signifier. In this instance, a provision implying a 
strict dichotomy between ‘employee’ and ‘independent contractor’ signifies 
that decision-makers should not acknowledge or allow a space to develop 
in which those who were not in employment, strictly defined, could make 
claims. At the same time, the provisions signify a legal space for employers to 
utilise in order to evade the legislation. 
It is indisputable that employers have done so in the period since the LRA 
was adopted. Indeed, it was primarily to combat the use of this space by such 
as the employer federation COFESA, and the increase in what has been char-
acterised as ‘disguised employment’, that the presumption as to who was an 
employee was introduced by way of the 2002 amendments to labour legisla-
tion.21 This presumption is discussed in more detail below.
3   THE COURTS, THE COMMON LAW AND THE EXCLUDED 
The necessity for labour legislation is generally ascribed to the inability of the 
common-law of contract to regulate labour relations, and specifically because of 
the unequal power the parties to the relationship have. What this means in prac-
tice, of course, is that the employer determines the terms of the contract and the 
employee accepts, because she or he needs a job and is in no position to bargain. 
One of the essential terms of this contract is that either party may terminate it on 
notice. Unless the employee has skills that are not easily replaced, the shorter the 
period of notice the better from the employer’s standpoint. Unless the employee 
has security of employment, she or he remains in a weak bargaining position. 
Labour legislation does not displace the common law. However, the com-
mon law and the courts are often regarded as playing a minor role in labour 
relations. 22 Consistent with this view, the regulation of labour relations is 
 
20 The State is also referred to as an employer. See s 213 0f the LRA. 
21 The explanatory memorandum published with the bills referred explicitly to the conduct of the Con-
federation of Employers of South Africa (COFESA), which ‘advise[d] employers that they can avoid 
labour legislation merely by stipulating in contracts that workers are independent contractors with-
out any fundamental change in the employment relationship’. It is, however, unclear why it was not 
possible to deal with what was widely perceived as a sham in terms of the existing provisions of the 
LRA. See, for example, Building Bargaining Council (Southern and Eastern Cape) v Melmons Cabinets 
CC & Another (2001) 22 ILJ 120 (LC) in which a contract supplied by COFESA was described as a 
‘sham’ that ‘perpetrated a cruel hoax’ on the employees who signed it.
22 Kahn-Freund, for example, said: ‘In the formulation of the rules which regulate the relations be-
tween employers and workers the common law has played a minor role. The courts have a share, 
but only a small share in their evolution’: Labour and the law, 2ed (1977) at 18–24. 
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sometimes regarded as having shifted from a position in which employment 
was defined primarily in terms of contract to a status, the aim of which is to 
reduce the contractual element of the relationship to the barest minimum.23  
For workers in non-standard employment relationships, however, the con-
tractual element is now of overriding importance, and especially so in the 
case of workers in a triangular employment relationship. This is because the 
term of their employment is determined by the contract of employment, as 
already noted in the case of workers placed by TESs and others. Moreover, 
these contracts are crafted so as to minimise the chance of workers whose 
contracts are terminated at the instance of the client to successfully claim 
unfair dismissal.24 At the same time, the economic reality is that not only 
their employment security but also their wages depend on the terms of an-
other contract to which they are not privy, namely the commercial contract 
between the service provider (TES) that employs them and the client.   
In order to deal with a scenario such as this, the role of the dispute resolu-
tion system established by the LRA in maintaining standards of fairness as-
sumes increased importance. It is public knowledge, of course, that the Com-
mission for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) handles a vast 
case-load, and the CCMA itself is not shy about trumpeting its successes in 
settling disputes or the number of cases determined at arbitration. However, 
such data reveal nothing about the number of workers in services such as se-
curity and cleaning whose claims are unsuccessful because in terms of their 
contract they were not dismissed.25 These are cases dismissed on preliminary 
points or because the CCMA finds that it has no jurisdiction. According to 
an official of one union organising in such services, their members are used 
to being told by CCMA commissioners that they should have challenged the 
contract before they signed it.26 
In a profession that is itself the product of hierarchy, it should come as 
no surprise that such deference to the contract of employment should still 
prevail. For a key element of the 1990 accord that gave rise to the present 
dispensation was acceptance of the hierarchy which the old LRA had al-
ready established, in terms of which a Labour Appeal Court, presided over 
by a high court judge, was the final arbiter of labour disputes. The judiciali-
sation of labour relations this represented was not questioned at the time. 
 
23 See, for example, Kahn-Freund O ‘A note on status and contract in British labour law’ (1967) Mod-
ern Law Review at 635; Honeyball S ‘Employment right and the primacy of contract’ (1989) 18 ILJ 
(UK) 97. See also Jordaan in Rycroft and Jordaan A guide to South African labour law 2nd ed (1992) 
at 26–32.
24 For examples of such contracts, see Theron et al (fn 17 above).
25 According to data from the CCMA’s Annual Report and Review of Operations for 1 April 2005 until 
31 March 2006, 125 035 cases were referred to the CCMA in this period. 31% were screened out 
on the basis that the CCMA did not have jurisdiction. Of 47 899 arbitrations conducted, 17 028 (or 
35%) were determined by way of a preliminary point. It is likely that a substantial proportion of 
the cases where the CCMA, correctly or incorrectly, is considered not to have jurisdiction concern 
workers in non-standard employment. In cases that go to arbitration and are decided by way of a 
preliminary point, it is likely that many if not most concern employees placed by service providers 
on fixed-term contracts, although further research is needed to verify this. The writer is indebted for 
the data to Paul Benjamin, who is not responsible for its analysis. See also (fn 17 above).
26 Interview with Jackson Simon, SATAWU. 
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27 Rather, organised labour appears to have subscribed to the view that it 
was a matter of influencing the personage of the judiciary and insulating the 
labour courts from the court system as a whole.28  
One of the consequences of judicialisation is a tendency to defer, in debates 
concerning what should be regarded as matters of labour relations policy, to 
‘the law’ as enunciated by the judiciary. However, the judiciary on the whole 
is concerned with doctrinal consistency. The Labour Appeal Court’s reaffir-
mation in 1999 of a decision twenty years earlier to adopt the so-called ‘domi-
nant impression’ test to differentiate between employees and independent 
contractors is an example of the judiciary ensuring doctrinal consistency with 
little or no acknowledgement of how radically the world of employment had 
been transformed in the interim.29 It still relies on a categorisation derived 
from Roman law in terms of which an employee is described as someone who 
renders ‘personal services’ as opposed to an independent contractor who per-
forms certain specified work or produces a certain result.30 It still relies on the 
example of the plumber and the electrician to validate this distinction, rather 
than the IT technician (whose task is never complete). There are, of course, 
independent contractors who perform certain specified work or produce a 
certain result but, increasingly, there are employees who do so as well.31 In 
the modern economy, where employment is ever more defined as a service, 
a characterisation of an employee as rendering services is not merely archaic 
but confusing. Between ‘employee’ and ‘independent contractor’ there is in-
creasingly a grey area that is not adequately captured by either.32  
In fact it would have been perfectly possible, given the wide scope sec-
ond part of the definition of employees, for the courts to regard ‘independ-
ent contractors’ located in this grey area as employees. That they have not 
done so can be attributed to the primacy they accord to the contract in terms 
of which the relationship between the parties is framed. For the courts, the 
nature of the relationship must always be ascertained from the terms of 
the contract unless there is evidence that it has been varied or is a sham. 
 
27 See Theron J‘Trade unions and the law: Victimisation and self help remedies’ (1997) 1 Law, De-
mocracy & Development 11. On the concept of judicialisation, see Ferejohn J ‘Judicializing politics, 
politicizing law’ (2002) 65 Law and Contemporary Problemns No.3.
28 Even now, the shock of some trade unionists and their sympathisers at the recent decisions of the 
Supreme Court of Appeal in NUMSA & others v Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd [2005] 5 BLLR 430 (SCA) and 
Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd (Rustenburg Section) v CCMA & others [2006] 11 BLLR 1021 (SCA) 
is expressed with referemce to the person of the judge who handed down the decision, whom they 
had supposed to be sympathetic to their cause.
29 See SABC v McKenzie [1999] 1 BLLR 1 (LAC) in which the approach followed in Smit v Workmen’s 
Compensation Commissioner 1979 (1) SA 51 (A) and earlier decisions was endorsed.
30 That is, the distinction between locatio conductio operarum and locatio conductio operis.
31 For example, it is permissible to pay employees on a piece-work basis or a task basis. The use of 
task-based systems of remuneration is increasingly prevalent.
32 Benjamin categorises dependent contractors and semi-independent workers as being in dependent 
self-employment: Benjamin P ‘An accident of history: Who is (and who should be) an employee 
under South African labour law (2004) 25 ILJ 787. Cheadle suggests that home workers, labour ten-
ants, owner-drivers, freelance journalists and sales representatives may be in ‘economically depend-
ent relationships of work’, as distinct from persons who run their own businesses, whom he regards 
as the genuine ‘independent contractor’, or the genuinely ‘self-employed’. See Cheadle, Davis and 
Haysom South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights (2002) 363.
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33 But ‘sham’ is a strong term, which will only apply in a limited number of 
cases.34 The notion of ‘disguised employment’, introduced by the Interna-
tional Labour Organisation, is open to the same objection. 
These notions imply a deliberate intent to bypass labour legislation and 
employment security provisions in a manner in which is not legitimate. Em-
ployers, in general, have no need to resort to this kind of measure if they are 
able to bypass labour legislation legitimately. All indications are that the most 
commonly utilised method of doing so is through externalisation, by utilising 
TESs and other service providers, and by utilising fixed-term contracts. 
4   THE AMENDMENTS TO LABOUR LEGISLATION 
ADOPTED IN 2002
In July 2000 the government proposed introducing a ‘presumption as to who 
is an employee’ in both the LRA and BCEA, amongst a number of other far-
reaching amendments to labour legislation. It will be argued that this was not 
an adequate response to the restructuring that had taken place, described 
above. A presumption of this kind, it should be noted from the outset, is not 
of assistance to workers in a triangular employment relationship where the is-
sue is not whether they are employed, but by whom they are really employed. 
Nevertheless, the presumption signified government’s intention to engage in 
some of the issues arising from externalisation. Anecdotal evidence suggests 
that, as a consequence, employers have re-examined certain categories of 
dependent contractor, such as the owner-driver, with a view to ensuring that 
they could withstand legal challenge.35 
The test of the new section, however, would be whether it would create 
legal space to challenge the kind of employment contracts that were increas-
ingly regulating non-standard employment. As initially proposed, the section 
commenced as follows: 
 ‘A person who works for, or renders services to, any other person is presumed, until the 
contrary is proved, to be an employee, regardless of the form of the contract of employ-
ment, if any one or more of the following factors is present ...’36
The reference to ‘regardless of the form of the contract of employment’ was 
modified in a later version to become ‘regardless of the form of the contract’, 
putting it beyond doubt that even where someone is ostensibly a contractor in 
terms of a written agreement, they may be presumed to be an employee in any 
situation where one or more of the listed factors are present. But the presump-
tion is rebuttable; in other words, the employer may prove the contrary. 
Seven factors were listed. However, one of the factors is of overriding impor-
tance: whether the ‘person is economically dependent on the other person for 
33 Liberty Life Asociation of Africa Ltd v. Niselow (1996) 17 ILJ 673 (LAC)
34 For cases in which the courts have regarded contracts ‘converting’ lesser skilled workers to employ-
ees as a sham see Christianson M ‘Defining who is an employee’(2001) October, 11, Contemporary 
Labour Law No 3, and the cases cited therein. See also Motor Industry Bargaining Council v Mac-
Rites Panel Beaters and Spray Painters (Pty) Ltd 2001 JDR 0100 (N) and Building Bargaining Council 
(Southern and Eastern Cape) v Melmons Cabinets CC & Another (fn 21 above)..
35 Personal contact, May 2007
36 S 83(1) of the BCEA and s 200A(1) of the LRA
LAW, DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENT
0652 Law Democracy and Developme34   34 11/16/07   2:00:42 PM
35
WHO’S IN AND WHO’S OUT
whom he or she works or renders services.’37 This is broad enough to encom-
pass any situation in which a contractor is in fact dependent on the person 
who engages him or her, since such dependence is at root economic. It could 
also, conceivably, cover another category of workers to which the explana-
tory memorandum referred, namely ‘those who fall within the definition of an 
employee but who are in practice unable to assert their rights as employees’, 
such as those engaged in part-time work, homework or casual work.38 
What this factor implied was the development of some form of economic 
dependence test. 39 Yet it remains to be seen is to what extent the creation of a 
presumption will contribute to the development of such a test. Take the case 
of a trade union claiming its collective agreement applies to workers whom 
the employer regards as excluded. The presumption is, after all, rebuttable. 
It will simply be necessary for the employer to put forward proof to rebut it. 
Until there is a hearing and the matter is determined, the union’s claim can-
not be enforced. Similarly, it is difficult to see how the presumption will help 
a bargaining council to bring recalcitrant employers in line. 
The procedure whereby there may be a hearing is for a ‘contracting party’ to 
approach the CCMA for an advisory award to determine whether the person 
involved in the arrangement are employees.40 But given that the more power-
ful economic entity invariably sets the terms for any such arrangements, it 
is difficult to conceive of any circumstance in which such an entity would 
wish to seek the CCMA’s guidance. It is similarly difficult to conceive of the 
less powerful ‘contracting party’ doing so, by virtue of the fact that it is less 
powerful and hence more vulnerable. The fact that since this procedure was 
adopted there have been very few advisory awards confirms this dynamic.  
Even so, the introduction of the presumption seemed to hold promise. It 
codified certain aspects of the ‘dominant impression’ test, while the prospect 
of the development of an economic dependence test suggested a basis on 
which more effective protection to workers in a triangular employment rela-
tionship. Three other factors were consistent with the development of such a 
test, as well as being objectively verifiable and hence less open to the objec-
tion that ‘dependence’ is a vague concept. One such factor was that the ‘per-
son has worked for that person for an average of at least 40 hours per month 
over the last three months’. 41 Another was that ‘the person only works for or 
renders services to one person’. 42 The third was that the person is ‘provided 
with the tools of the trade or work equipment by the other person’.43
But to develop a new test requires adopting a new mindset. The indica-
tions were that the CCMA (and, by implication, the courts) should adopt a 
new mindset in determining what is or is not an employment relationship. 
 
37 Ss (1)(e)
38 Basic Conditions of Employment Amendment Bill, 2000: Explanatory memorandum, Government 
Gazette 21407 of 27 July 2000
39 See, for example, Du Toit et al Labour relation law: A comprehensive guide 5 ed (2006) at 77–78.
40 S 200A(3)
41 Ss (1)(d )
42 Ss (1)(g )
43 Ss (1)(f)
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The fundamental question the presumption raised was whether these indi-
cations were clear enough. As it turned out, a change to the initial proposal 
was made at a late stage, apparently at the instance of organised business 
in the deliberations of the Millenium Labour Council. A provision was intro-
duced limiting the scope of the presumption to persons earning less than an 
earnings threshold determined by the Minister in terms of section 6(3) of the 
BCEA.44 There can be no valid conceptual rationale for this threshold. If the 
factors introduced are valid indicators of an employment relationship, they 
must hold for all employment relationships. The effect of the threshold was 
to fundamentally undermine the integrity the proposed new presumption and 
its potential to effect a new mindset, given that the factors proposed did not 
apply to persons earning above the threshold.
4.1  The code of good practice: who is an employee 
For anyone who supposed there was a more optimistic reading possible re-
garding the introduction of an earnings threshold in the new presumption, the 
recently promulgated ‘Code of Good Practice: Who is an employee’ makes 
depressing reading.45 The Code is 53 pages long. Notwithstanding the inclu-
sion of the ILO’s 2006 ‘Recommendation concerning the employment rela-
tionship’ there is little evidence of a new mindset in it. Instead, it comprises 
merely another exposition of ‘the law’ as it stands, including an exposition 
concerning laws other than the BCEA and LRA. 
Evidently this is a document drafted by lawyers for lawyers, which is in-
tended to apply in any proceedings in terms of the BCEA or LRA in which a 
party ‘alleges that they are an employee and one or more parties …disputes 
this allegation’. It may well be of assistance to lawyers in cases of ‘disguised 
employment’.46 However, as I have argued, ‘disguised employment’ ought not 
to have been the primary object of the reform.
In any event it is not clear on what basis the Code seeks to oblige deci-
sion-makers to have regard for its provisions. Its authority emanates from 
the tripartite process of consultation that gave rise to it. However, this may 
well prove a constraint placed on organised labour’s capacity to make legal 
claims based on what is just and politically defensible, for very little return. 
After all, the fact that a party satisfies the requirements of the presumption 
does not establish the applicant is an employee. All it does it to shift the 
onus onto the employer to lead rebutting evidence. Where rebutting evidence 
is led, it appears that the factors contained in the presumption are of no 
 
 
44 That is, the threshold concerning the regulation of hours of work. See ss 83A(2) of the BCEA and 
200A(2) of the LRA. S 6(3) of the BCEA requires the Minister, on the advice of the Employment Con-
ditions Commission, to make a determination excluding the chapter regulating hours of work from 
applying to any category of employees earning in excess of an amount stated in that determination. 
The threshold was set at R115 572 per year in 2003: Government Gazette No 25012 of 14 March 
2003
45 Government Gazette No 29445 of 1 December 2006 
46 A case in point is Sepheu Moffat Modishane v Noordval Security (Case no GAPT9564–06; unreported 
CCMA award) where the commissioner found that a contract stating the applicant was an independ-
ent contractor was calculated to disguise an employment relationship. 
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relevance whatever. Instead the ‘dominant impression’ test is applied.47 Giv-
en that the factors creating the presumption are no longer relevant, as well 
as the breadth and subjective nature of the ‘dominant impression’ test, it is 
difficult to see what purpose the presumption serves. The same result could 
have been achieved simply by placing an onus on the party disputing there is 
an employment relationship, without any reference to factors. On this inter-
pretation, what the code creates is conceptual confusion.
The same conceptual confusion is found in its commentary on employees 
of temporary employment services. Section 198 is the section of the LRA that 
designates the TES as the employer of the workers it provides to its client.48 
In order to determine whether or not the section applies, the Code states, it 
is necessary to determine ‘whether the relationship between the client is a 
genuine arrangement and not a subterfuge entered for the purpose of avoid-
ing any aspect of labour legislation’.49 It would be of considerable value if 
this provision of the Code could be used to disclose the terms of an agree-
ment between the client and the temporary employment service. Yet it seems 
unlikely this will happen. In any event this provision of the Code misses the 
point about section 198: that by designating the TES as employer it in effect 
legitimates avoidance of aspects of labour legislation.
‘Whether or not an individual supplied to a client by a TES is an employee of the client 
or an independent contractor’, the Code states, ‘must be determined by reference to the 
actual working relationship between the worker and the “client”…. If it is found that the 
individual has an employment relationship with the client, then for the purposes of the 
LRA and the BCEA (a) the individual is an employee of the TES; (b) the TES is the indi-
vidual’s employer’.
To the layperson this seems like gobbledygook. The effect is to preserve law 
as the domain of lawyers and courts, depriving the broader community, and 
organised labour and business, of a role in its interpretation.      
5  CONCLUSION
The struggle to include the excluded is at the same time a struggle to organise 
the unorganised. One lesson to be learnt from the history of previous strug-
gles is not to place undue reliance on the courts. The best prospect for achiev-
ing an expansive interpretation of the employment relationship in the CCMA 
and the courts is by establishing effective organisations of those that are cur-
rently excluded from its protection. Perhaps before we can expect a change 
of mindset from the courts there must be a change of mindset amongst the 
unions. 
47 S 22(b), Code.
48 The equivalent section in the BCEA is s 83.
49 S 55, Code
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